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The Extra-Territorial Scope of the Anti-Corruption
Legislation in Nigeria
OLAKUNLE 0. OLAGOKE*
The laws of morality are the same everywhere, and... there is no action which would passfor an act of
extortion, of peculation, of bribery, and of oppression in England, that is not an act of extortion, of
peculation, of bribery and oppression in Europe, Asia, Africa, and all the world over.
Edmund Burke (1788)
Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot last long.
Edmund Burke (1777)
He who feels it knows it most.
Popular Saying
For a long time, Nigeria has endured the destructive stranglehold of various types of
corruption. This article is a commentary on the recently enacted anti-corruption legislation
in Nigeria. By any measure, in scope and detail, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related
Offences Act 2000 (Act), is an exceptional piece of legislation. The Act signifies an intention
to come to grips with the old and new age nature of corruption. The Act took effect on
June 13, 2000. The offence of corruption, like most crimes, is traditionally conceived as a
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domestic matter. The offence focuses its attention on civil servants or public officers, and
as a matter of necessary extension, the relationship between crooked private businesses and
public servants., However, a corrupt state is a harbinger and producer of many imaginable
evils in a commercial global community. This article discusses the impact of the extra-
territorial scope of the legislation vis-a3-vis business to public interface and business to busi-
ness interaction. This extra-territoriality is a new front in Nigerian law and policy. It is
indisputably guided by the social, economic, and political consequences of corruption on
the country, the West African region, and traditional trading countries such as Europe and
America.
This article, for reasons of space, does not discuss policy issues, teething problems, and
possible solutions intricately tied to domestic corruption issues and practices arising from
the Act. The article will contain six parts containing the following issues: Corruption as an
Institution (Part I); Scope and Impact of the Act (Part II); Offences that Constitute Cor-
ruption (Part III); Extra-Territorial Provisions of the Act (Part IV); Problems of Enforce-
ment of Legal Norms (Part V); and Recommendations and Conclusions (Part VI). This
article will show that the Act must be reinforced by additional legislative provisions, ad-
ministrative regulatory measures, and support by the international community to achieve
the original goals of enactment.
I. Corruption as an Institution
A. EMBRACING CORRUPTION
Corruption of public and private offices is loosely described but easily recognised as a
universal phenomenon.' It is associated in varying degrees with modern states. Nigeria is,
however, one of the most notoriously corrupt states.3 Generally, corruption has been un-
derstood as a socio-cultural issue.4 However, in reality, it appears to be a manifestation of
1. See ANTHONY ARLIDGE &JACQUES PARRY, ARLIDGE & PARRY ON FRAUD 382, 390 (1996); Bruce Zagaris &
Shaila Lakhani Ohri, The Emergence of an International Enforcement Regime on Transnational Corruption in the
Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 53 (1999); OECD, Public Sector Corruption-An International Survey of
Prevention Measures (1999), available at http://wwwl.oecd.org/puma/ethics/pubs/psc99/execsumm.htm (lastvis-
ited Nov. 12, 2003).
2. See generally CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (Margaret P. Spencer & Ronald R. Sims eds., 1995); POLITICAL
CORRUPTION (Paul Haywood eds., 1997); JEFFREY P. BeiAos & GREGORY HUSiSIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMICS (1997); P. DAVIES, INVISIBLE CRIMES
(1999); OFOsu-AMAAH ET AL., COMBATING CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF SELECTED ASPECTS OF
STATE PRACTICES AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES (1999); OECD, No LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL:
FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION (2000). See also UNESCO, Corruption in Western Democracies, 54 INr'L
Soc. Sci. J. 174 (1996); Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DurIJ. COMP. &
INT'L L. 345 (2000); Martin A. Rogoff, Corruption, Democracy, and the Rule of Law in France, 15 TUL. EUR. &
Civ. L.F. 107, 108-09 (2001).
3. Simon Coldham, Legal Responses to State Corruption in Commonwealth Af"ica, 39 J. AFR. L. 115 (1995). See
also J.S.E. Opolot, Organised Crimes as it Emerges in Sections of Africa, in ORGANIZED CRIME-A GLOBAL PER-
SPECTIVE 192 (RobertJ. Kelly ed., 1986); T.A. Aguda, THE CRISIS OFJUSTICE vii-viii (1986); M. Levi, Regulating
Fraud Revisited, in INVISIBLE CRIMES 143, 157 (1999).
4. There are three ways this issue of cultural relativity may be interpreted. First, it is part of the history and
traditions of the people. This explanation is usually from western scholars describing the high incidence of
corruption in third world states. This writer rejects this thesis from the Nigerian standpoint. While it is difficult,
if not impossible, to justify certain habits and treatment of public officers, particularly in sensitive offices, as in
the judiciary and police, the thesis reflects a serious misunderstanding of cultural practices and traditions,
VOL. 38, NO. 1
ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION IN NIGERIA 73
regulatory inadequacies' and economic management. 6 Corruption covers sleaze, corporate
misconduct, money laundering, bribery, and fraud. It embraces abuse of power, favouritism,
expectation of return of favours, secret bargains, and non-disclosure where there is a duty
of disclosure.
Due to its high ethical standards, voluble moral content, and the extensive situations in
trade, employment, politics, judicial administration, and public services where contested
practices can emerge, "corruption" is a sensitive offence. A positivist intolerance of cor-
ruption in Nigeria could be measured by criminal legislation. More important, is the effi-
cacy of institutional mechanisms prohibiting, curtailing, or enforcing penalties for corrupt
practices.7 Piecemeal legislation and provisions penalising corruption have long existed in
Nigeria's principal criminal statutes.' They also can be found in the main companies and
financial institutions legislation. Similarly, certain common law doctrines-particularly in
relation to equity and trust-form part of Nigerian anti-corruption law. However, penal
provisions fell largely into disuse as there were few prosecutions in an otherwise laden
particularly unilateral gifts, favors, and appreciation of persons within the community for services actually or
previously rendered. Most importantly, gift giving is not necessarily a matter of bribery, although it would now
be under the law. In fact, the evidence is that Nigerians celebrated the fall of regimes for being corrupt. See
Coldham, supra note 3. The second way is to use cultural relativity to justify corrupt practices as a way of life
and to escape the consequences of such actions. This thesis ignores the reality that corruption is a crime with
long-term consequences and is in a way victimless. Thus, complaints and reactions to corruption are always
slow and limited to the elite who have a stake in what is at issue. A third way, is the continuous role persons
known to be corrupt play in the social and political lives of societies. In Nigeria, for example, some of these
persons become leaders in their regional communities and are catapulted to the national stage. It, however,
appears that this is truly an issue of poverty, ignorance, or despair in those societies. Recommendations and
Conclusions, Part VIA, infra. For a well researched treatnent of the cultural relativity theory, see Phillip M.
Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime and Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption
in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA.J. INT'L EcoN. L. 863 (2001).
5. This is explained by (I) the frequent changes of government, policies, and officials; (2) the educational or
professional limitations of public officers, including the police; (3) the overloaded responsibilities of the police;
(4) lapses in accounting and professional standards in government and public contracts, and; (5) the absence
or failure of institutional professional regulatory and enforcement mechanisms in the sectors. SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT-CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 7-87 (1999).
6. Bad economic policies and implementation strategies promote corruption. Bureaucratization and mo-
nopolization of economic activities by governments and persons linked to government foster corruption because
those who need to do business or extract their rights find themselves at the mercy of inefficient or extortionate
public or private officials. Id.
7. See PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi
Osinbajo eds., 1991). See C. OKONKWO, CRIMINAL LAW IN NIGERIA 355 (1980).
8. The main pieces of criminal legislation are the Criminal Code (CC) and Criminal Procedure Act (CPA),
which apply in southern states. The Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code apply in northern states. These
pieces of legislation were introduced by the British colonial authorities. Different sections applied to corruption.
See generally §§ 98, 99, 100, 494 CC. Specific federal legislation designed to tackle corruption includes the
Corrupt Practices Act, 1975, The Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Act, 1984, Failed
Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malpractices) Decree No 18, 1994, and the Bank Employees, Etc.
(Declaration of Assets) Decree, 1986. The first two were designed to try mainly public officers, while the two
latter laws focused principally on corrupt practices involving private businesses and employees in the banking
sector. The Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunals) Act, 1984 was displaced by a later decree
by the same regime when it was made punishable to allege corruption against former or serving public officers.
See Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree No 4, 1984. The decree gained notoriety after two
journalists were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for publishing what was substantially true, but not
true in "all material particular."
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corrupt environment The private law remedies available from courts were largely slow in
coming and, once in place, were ineffective.Il Various political and civic measures aimed at
exposing or tackling corruption conspicuously failed. It was obvious that the beneficiaries
of corruption had the power to resist.
Two contrasting views identify the possible reasons for failure. The first view is that any
reformist zeal or approach was dictated by purely expedient political motives. In this case,
the populace simply failed to support the actions of the government of the day. The second
view suggests that there was a political reason behind the governmental and institutional
failure to tackle corruption. They simply benefited and used corruption as a basis of eco-
nomic and political patronage. In the course of time, Nigerians lost hope in combating
corruption. Gradually, corrupt practices became a way of life and a way of doing business."
Consequently, for a period of time, Nigeria earned the notorious unwelcome prestige of
being the world's most corrupt country.
Corruption became synonymous with public and private business."I Other than its pop-
ular description as bribe or embezzlement, corruption earned different soubriquets in local
and official languages. Thus, while communication terms like kickback, settlement, ten
percent, thank you, 419, egunje, riba, apriko, and the like were born, the language of
corruption became a byword for commercial vice or sharpness with a view to profit. Taking
into consideration the rampant occurrences of economic and political malfeasance and the
failure of respective governments' efforts to combat corruption, it was concluded by the
beginning of the 1990s that corruption was institutionalised in Nigeria."
B. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE 1990s
In the 1990s, corruption operated in a different structural environment. This environ-
ment was created by new economic policies structured to be markedly different from the
traditional welfare model. There was the infusion of the dynamics of deregulation, liber-
alisation, and globalisation of the Nigerian economy. There is abundant evidence that from
this period corruption increased.
There were three ways in which the new economic environment affected the systemic
operation of corruption. The first impact was the accompanying mental ideology that came
with the policies. Deregulation and privatisation created opportunities for cheap invest-
ment, quick rewards, and secret opportunities for singular or corporate proprietorship.
9. C. OKONKWO, supra note 7, at 355-76. The learned author provides that the reason is that the existing
provisions under the existing statute are "far from clear." Id. at 355.
10. After a series of Supreme Court judgments made it difficult to discipline or enforce liability for punish-
able offences without prior criminal conviction, it became difficult for government agencies, companies, or
employers to take actions in respect to staff known, or found, to be corrupt by professional inquiry. Staff
members could simply challenge the findings and relied on the delays in the court process to continue to work.
See generally Denloye v. Med. & Dental Med. Practitioners, I A.LL N.L.R. 106 (1968); Garba v. Univ. of
Maiduguri, I N.W.L.R. (Pt. 18) 550 (1986); Bishi v. Judicial Serv. Comm'n, 6 N.W.L.R (Pt. 197) 331 (1991).
11. In the mid-I 980s, a chairman of one of the leading multinational construction companies testified before
a tribunal. The tribunal tried politicians on corruption related charges. In the construction business, it was
known that contracts would only be awarded to those who paid money to politicians or their agents.
12. See P.D. Ocheje, Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria's Corrupt Practices and Other
Related Offences Act 2000, 45 J. ARK. L. 173 (2001); see also Osinbajo, supra note 7.
13. See also S.M. Musa, Anatomy of Corruption and Other Economic Crimes in Nigerian Public Life, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA 30 (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo eds.,
1991).
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Literally overnight, millionaires emerged. This further challenged collective and traditional
senses of work and ethics, while strongly advancing the charge and connotation of the
growing involvement in corruption. The second effect was the emergence of non-state
actors as principal parties or powerful agents performing traditional or non-traditional
duties and exercising considerable powers and influence. This situation broadened oppor-
tunities for corrupt practices from the previously maligned public servant to private busi-
nesses and officials.' 4 The third effect was the difficulty of controlling corrupt tendencies
and practices as a result of an accompanying lax regulatory regime." Thus, those who
justified the new structural shift as a way of curbing corruption found out that it resurfaced
with vigour to match the new age, acquiring more followers and practitioners.16
C. FOREIGN DIMENSION
There is a foreign dimension to the practice of corruption in Nigeria, which dates back
to the early 1970s. This was the period associated with the oil boom. After this, the practice
and pace of corruption was restricted until the new economic structure of the 1990s stim-
ulated opportunities for new, subtle, or brazen methods. The foreign dimension has also
been promoted by increased migration between Nigeria and other countries.
Two principal actors can be identified as acting independently or jointly on the inter-
national stage. These are Nigerian citizens and foreigners. Nigerians utilised existing and
emerging opportunities to corruptly deal in or relocate assets abroad. Further, they acted
from abroad to corruptly infringe the domestic laws of the country. Foreign associates either
turned a blind eye or provided financial or other logistical and professional support.
7
Domestically, foreigners initially appeared to become involved through dealings with the
government (government contracts) and the processing of foreign exchange transactions
and profit repatriation. In a liberalised economic regime, the role of foreigners in the Ni-
gerian economy steadily increased, due in large part to the government's investment mea-
sures. Joining in the new wave of corruption was as much a necessity as a temptation. In
truth, Nigerians exploit foreigners just as much as foreigners exploit Nigeria's structural
weaknesses.'"
14. Id. at 30, 33. Persons subject to the offences include an official in a private organization, corporate body,
or other employment. Similarly, public officers are now recognized to cover a person employed or engaged in
any capacity in public corporations or private companies wholly or jointly floated, including subsidiaries, by
any government, whether located in Nigeria or outside.
15. See R.P. Saba & L. Manzetti, Privatisation in Argentina: The Implications for Corruption, 25 CRIME, LAw
& SOCIAL CHANGE 353 (1997), reproduced in TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 377 (N. Passas ed., 1999).
16. RosE-AcKERMAN, supra note 5, 35-38.
17. Director of Research, Central Bank of Nigeria, Anatomy of Corruption and Other Economic Crimes, in
PERSPEcTIvEs ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER EcoNoMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA 86, 97 (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo
eds., 1991); A. Goldman et al., Nigeria Suffers From Slick Operation to Steal its Crude, FIN. TIMES, May 29, 2003,
at 20. See also Akinsanya v. United Bank for Africa, 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 35) 273 (1986); Bendel State v. United
Bank for Africa, 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 37) 547 (1986) (particularly 562 (C)-(D), 565 (A)-(B)); Compagnie Noga
d'Importation v. Abacha & Anor, 3 ALL ER 513, 315-16 (2001).
18. See G.K. Olufon, White Collar Criminality and Frauds in Financial Institutions in Nigeria-Possible Solutions,
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA 130 (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo
eds., 1991). There, the fraud involving two English merchant banks, Hill Samuels and Johnson Matheys Bank-
ers, are analyzed. See also recent news report about a scam involving "some Asian business men alongside their
Nigerian counterparts." Y. Olaniyonu, FG to penalize Banks, Bizmen for Fertilizer Importation Scam, THIS DAY,
Sept. 1, 2002, at 2; Oliver Burkeman, Cheney Firm Paid Millions in Bribes to Nigerian Official, THE GUARDIAN
(UK), May 9, 2003, at 13. (Halliburton, the multinational oil service company, filed information with the U.S.
SEC that it made an improper payment of $2.4 million to a Nigerian official).
SPRING 2004
76 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
On one hand, it is now known that certain foreign corporations directly or indirectly
promoted corrupt practices in Nigeria.' 9 On the other hand, the emergence of unregulated
local and foreign agents, associates, advisers, or lobbyists put pressure on foreign corpo-
rations to adopt recommended, business methods or "sharp practices." Indeed, certain for-
eign states with interests in Nigeria were accused of promoting their companies' criminal
way of doing business abroad.o
The counter-argument deployed was that such practices were the only way of entering
into or doing business in the Nigerian market."I The temptation to avoid corruption is
decreased in a globalised world once it is recognised as a cultural way of doing business and
therefore may be legitimately defended in the foreign country. In the alternative, 'fees' paid
are cheap when measured by the value of the local currency and strength of the foreign
currency. Furthermore, many states refused to co-operate in extraditing, assisting in inves-
tigating, or recovering assets of corrupt public officers and politicians with sizeable assets
in their jurisdictions. Foreign-induced corruption is also complicated, difficult to prove,
and expensive to pursue. It is also possible that local procedural or extra-legal requirements
may frustrate any attempt to realise the fruits of the success. Where there was a likelihood
of co-operation, a 'high price' was exacted from the pursuing states.
In short, corruption in Nigeria is diversified. It has different roots, causes, and operates
in private and public sectors on different scales. Unless corruption makes its full impact
and becomes virtually intolerable, it will remain a fabric of modern Nigerian society.
D. IMPACT IN NIGERIA
The negative impact of corruption on developing countries is undisputed." 2 The impact
has been stated to be massive, pervasive, epidemic proportion, rife in all facets of the Ni-
gerian economy, and the like.23 In Nigeria, it has destroyed the legitimacy or credibility of
governments, 4 dented the image of public and traditional institutions of governance,"
affected the image and quality of the judiciary,16 torn the social and cultural fabric of so-
ciety,7 and stifled economic development projects and policies."s It has also affected genuine
investor confidence.z9
19. Thomas J. Biersteker, MULTINATIONALS, THE STATE, AND CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 223
(1987); Olufon, supra note 18.
20. See Charlotte Denny, Scramble for Africa--Corruption and Chaos-True Cost of New OilRush, THE GUAt-
LAN (UK), June 17, 2003, at 1; K. Guha, Anti-bribery Law to Cover Deas Abroad, FIN. TIMES, July 2002, at 1;
T. Delare, A Sea Change in Anti-Corruption Efforts, in No LONGER BUSINESS As UsuAL 93 (2000).
2 1. There is some economic truth in this, provoking a catch-22 situation for a genuine investor. However,
there are other situations of blatant rigging in competitive sectors, unscrupulous foreign businesses, and their
agents obtaining favorable and anti-competitive advantages. Sections 17()(a)-(c) and 18(c), Corrupt Practices
and Other Related Offences Act 2000.
22. See Nancy Z. Boswell, The Law Erpectation, and Reality in the Marketplace: The Problems of and Responses
to Corruption, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 139, 140 (1999); Coldham, supra note 3; Ocheje, supra note 12;
GACC, Report on the Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey 2000, 45 J. AxR. L. 233 (2001).
23. See Osinbajo, supra note 7, at 8, 13, 53, 87.
24. Coldham, supra note 3, at 115.
25. Ocheje, supra note 12, at 174.
26. C. NwAscwo ET AL., NIGERIA-THE LIMITS oFJUsTICE 32-33 (1993). Section 2(a), which includes judges
of inferior courts of record amongst "public officers" subject to the Act.
27. Ocheje, supra note 12, at 183.
28. Id. at 175. See also Denny, supra note 20.
29. Ocheje, supra note 12, at 185.
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Corruption within businesses and between businesses adversely rebounds on innocent
shareholders, competing companies, creditors, and, in fact, the whole economic sub-
sector.30 Governments' and agencies' purses have been skimmed and depleted by lost in-
come or revenue. It threatens national unity, challenges sovereignty, and halts economic
competitiveness.', In certain instances, collaboration between private and public officers
has caused the deaths of innocent citizens, whether by the collapse of buildings or bridges,
or the consumption or utilization of fake and dangerous products produced in or imported
into the country. Certain public institutions, like schools and universities, have collapsed.
Sophisticated and violent crimes could also appear. Internationally, ordinarily honest Ni-
gerians have lost their respectability. Complaints voiced by Nigerians suggest that they are
unfairly disadvantaged in businesses and professions by false speculations and prejudices
tied to corruption. Government or private attempts at borrowing, renegotiating loan pay-
ments, or debt forgiveness, largely failed since international lenders rightly feared that loans
would go into a "black hole" or encourage a new cycle of corruption. There is no doubt
that Nigeria has paid a high price for corruption. This proper understanding of the negative
impact of corruption is a prime motive for specifically providing legislation for combating
corruption managed by a Commission."
H. Scope and Impact of the Act
A. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK
With a solid knowledge of the history of corrupt practices within and outside Nigeria,
the designers of the Act achieve an unrivalled scope. Generally, it criminalizes actions that
promote or assist the common law tort of unjust enrichment in dealings with governmental
institutions and agencies and dealings involving non-governmental actors. It has a strong
and broad moral flavour and therefore would follow the mischief rule of interpretation
applied in Nigerian case law." Although it mainly focuses on economic corruption carried
out in the course of business activity, it is also concerned with corruption of politicians for
economic motives.
34
30. This impact is notable with failed Nigerian banks and financial institutions, particularly between 1992
and 1995. The military regime consequently set up a Tribunal to try offenders, including chief executives and
borrowers of these banks.
31. Goldman et al., supra note 17 (discussing how corruption fostering illegal bunkering threatens the se-
curity situation in Nigeria, particularly with the emergence of well organized, armed, and rich bunkerers with
capacity to fight government security forces). See Denny, supra note 20 (reporting on how corporate profit and
other states' national security driven goals threaten to launch a cycle of conflict, corruption, and environmental
degradation in Nigeria and the West African region). See M. Critharis, Third World Nations Are Down in the
Dumps: The Exportation of Hazardous Waste, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 311, 317, 337-38 (1990) (providing a general
view in other jurisdictions including Nigeria); Biios & HusisIAN, supra note 2, at 16, 21-23.
32. Section 3 establishes the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (Com-
mission). Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act 2000, Act No. 5, § 3 (2000), available at http://
nigeria-law.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Corrupt Practices Act]; see also § 6(e) and (f).
33. It achieves this by admitting circumstantial evidence and presumptions. See also Biobaku v. Police, 20
N.L.R. 30 (1951) (applying a mischief rule of interpretation to define "official corruption" under section 98
of the Criminal Code). Similarly, section 9(l)(a) of the Bank Employees, Etc. (Declaration of Assets) Act 1986,
now Cap 27 1990, specifically promotes the objects of the law approach by outlawing and penalizing conduct
by persons who act as fronts.
34. See Corrupt Practices Act § 2, under the definitions of Agent, Gratification, and political party. Cf. id.
§ 18, which deals with the buying of influence. See also Haywood, supra note 2, at 22-39.
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The Act can be stated to have the following effects: First, it is a federal legislation having
national effect." Second, it is a statute that creates and must be interpreted as a fundamental
public policy of Nigeria.36 Third, it covers not only corrupt dealings relating to public
officers and public institutions, but also strictly private dealings between private busi-
nesses." Fourth, it has an extra-territorial effect in relation to investigation and liability for
enumerated offences. Fifth, it imposes a duty of disclosure and assistance on all persons
who may be subject to the Act and who are required to provide information. To a consid-
erable extent, the common law duty of professional confidentiality has been overridden."
Sixth, it is not acceptable to use corruption as a tool of commerce or trade or a basis of
social and cultural norms.3 9 Seventh, the abridgment of standard human rights norms, re-
lating to fair hearing, privacy, and property rights, may be deemed constitutionally reason-
able and necessary where investigation procedures of corruption in public or private office
are at issue.4° Finally, the administrative apparatus of the Act, the Commission, is a powerful
body operating independently of any other organ and superior to any other law enforcement
agency in matters within its subject matter jurisdiction. 41
35. Corrupt Practices Act § 67. States' laws remain operable and will be enforced by the police or other
authorized officers, to the extent that they are different from the provisions and policies of the federal Act. See
also A.G. Ondo v A.G. Federation, 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt 772) 222, 305(D)-306(A), 338(H), 339(H)-340(D)-(G)
(2002).
36. This means that it transcends private and public relations and must be respected in defining rights and
liabilities. Corrupt Practices Act § 60.
37. Okonkwo, supra note 7, at 356 (identifying two types of corruption--official corruption and judicial
corruption). But see A. Adeyemi, Corruption in Nigeria: The Criminological Perspective and A.IJ. Etuk, White
Collar Criminality and Frauds in Financial Institutions in Nigeria-Possible Solution, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUP-
TION AND OTHER ECONOMIC CRIMES IN NIGERIA 1-2, 109 (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi Osinbajo eds., 1991).
38. See generally Corrupt Practices Act §§ 25, 39, 40, 43-44.
39. Id. § 60.
40. See generally id. §§ 37, 45, 46, 48, 50. According to a scholar:
Political and public office holders occupy positions of trust vis-h-vis the management of the wealth of
the nation. There is therefore, every reason to support a legislation that seeks to make them accountable
as trustees in the management of the nation's wealth... A nation plagued by corruption, abuse of
office and white collar crimes, deserves a more result-oriented legislation which seeks to combat the
commission of these offences and to ensure the economic survival of the nation. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the provision.., which puts the burden of proving non-commission of offences on accused
persons does not in any way negate the principles of administration of justice. On the contrary, it
should be seen as reflecting the socio-economic realities of the nation.
See T. Osipitan, Administration of Criminal Justice: Fair Trial, Presumption of Innocence and the Special Military
Tribunals, in LAw AND DEVELOPMENT 312, 328-29. In A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, the Supreme Court
constitutionally validated the right of the Commission to seize property on suspicion that it believes it to be
tainted with the offence of corruption. 9 N.W.L.R. (Pt 722) 222 (2002). On the other hand, the Supreme
Court invalidated as unconstitutional the powers given to the Commission in section 35 to detain a suspect
indefinitely. It also invalidated the prescription provided in section 26 (3) that judgment shall be delivered
within ninety days. See id. at 309.
41. Corrupt Practices Act § 3(14). See also 'The Powers of the Commission and Chairman'Part II.F. The powers
of the Commission chairman generated fear and suspicion from the federal legislature causing severe political
crisis in the first term of the Obasanjo government. An amendment bill was passed before the end of tenure
of the first set of civilian legislators in May 2003. The executive arm vetoed the bill, but it has since been passed
as law. However, it is likely the amendments will be invalidated in current court proceedings. It is probably
correct to say that the legislature lost political integrity. Many of the proponents of the amendment Act lost
their electoral seats. President Obasanjo has recently declared his attention to continue with the original law
but will strengthen the provisions of the law.
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B. PERSONS
Those who are likely to be faced with the impact of the Act are widely covered by the
interpretation section as: 42 Agent, Associate, Bank, Corporate Body, Financial Institution,
an Official, Person, Principal, Public Officer, Purchaser in good faith for valuable consid-
eration, and Relation. These persons must have been involved in corruption, gratification,
or dealing in property as a business, or otherwise. This covers foreigners or corporations
based abroad. While certain definitions, notably those of banks, corporate body, and finan-
cial institutions, are fixed by specific statutes to mean locally based companies, foreign
companies operating such businesses, will be subject to the interpretation criteria of asso-
ciate, agent, person, or principal, as the situation may arise. Otherwise, persons covered
specifically are Nigerian citizens outside Nigeria, and persons granted permanent residence
in Nigeria.43 It is provided that the Act shall have effect outside as well as within Nigeria
when an offence under the Act is committed in any place outside Nigeria 4 Advocates and
solicitors may be ordered to disclose information regarding a transaction or deal relating
to any property.
45
C. PRIVATE CORRUPTION AND RELATED OFFENCES
The Act seeks to prohibit private corruption. Private corruption entails offences done in
a strictly private business environment. It also involves breaches of private or public regu-
latory legal standards. 46 There is usually harm to the public, but such direct harm is not
necessary. The immediate victims are the company's shareholders, employees, and com-
petitors. There need not be a government or public officer or institution involved.
47 The
Act prohibits private corruption by any person for himself or others.48 It also provides for
related offences applicable to private corruption. These offences cover corporate miscon-
duct manifested as a corporate policy, collusion to rig a price, market, or competition, as
well as an individual employee's actions. Thus, an employee of an oil company who engages
in corruption in relation to the employer's business will be subject to the Act. Similarly, a
person who commits postal fraud in Nigeria or abroad will be liable under the Act.49
42. Corrupt Practices Act § 2.
43. Id. at § 66(1). This is the so-called "nationality principle" which also incorporates a permanent resident
status for non-nationals.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 39.
46. See, e.g., id. § 21.
47. According to Uwaifo JSC: "The Act does not discriminate between public officers and private persons.
If it did the purpose it was meant to fight corruption would be defeated." [sic]. See A.G. Ondo State v. A.G.
Federation, N.W.L.R. (Pt. 772) 222, 420 (2002). See also Uwais CJN, at 306 (A). Cf. Corrupt Practices Act
§ 1 1(d).
48. Id. §§ 8(l)(a), 9(l)(a), 13, 17, 23(2).
49. Id. § 14. Postal fraud involving Nigerians has been a notorious issue. Generally, the crime is a unilateral
undertaking by a felon to obtain money by false pretences. However, to the extent that it involves another
party and is done with the intention to defraud a public or private institution it is a crime of corruption. Its
corruption element involves participating by paying or giving money through offers made by post, with the
intention to assist in bribing a public official, unjustly enriching oneself, or laundering of proceeds of such
crime.
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D. PROHIBITIONS, PROSECUTION, TERMS, AND FINES
A person in possession of property tainted with corruption, on the application of the
chairman of the Commission, may be prohibited by the court from dealing with the prop-
erty. 0 Persons subject to the penal provisions of the Act may be prosecuted by either of
three bodies. These committees are the Commission,"' the Attorney General of the Fed-
eration, 2 and the Nigerian Police." Specific conviction terms generally range from two to
seven years imprisonment. Forfeiture of property and fines may also be imposed. Forfeiture
will take place where a person tried for corruption cannot satisfactorily account for bona
fide or lawful ownership of property.5 4 Where no penalty is specifically provided, a fine not
exceeding Naira 10,000 and/or a prison sentence of not more than two years shall be
imposed."
E. IMMUNITIES
The Act's explanatory memorandum explicitly provides protection for anybody who pro-
vides information about an offence committed or likely to be committed. The Act, there-
fore, promotes whistle blowing in two ways. First, it immunises the party from civil or
contractual liability16 Secondly, it protects the party from criminal prosecution as an ac-
complice. sr Further, negligence or recklessness in the performance of a public or private
duty that bestows undeserved benefit to some person arguably does not constitute an offence
under the law.
F. THE COMMISSION AND THE CHAIRMAN
The Commission is an independent body with duties and powers set out in various
sections of the statute.58 Section 6(a) has resonance with this article. It provides:
It shall be the duty where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has conspired
to commit or has attempted to commit or has committed an offence under this Act or any
other law prohibiting corruption, to receive and investigate any report of the conspiracy to
commit, attempt to commit or the commission of such offence and in appropriate cases to
prosecute the offenders."
The Commission is a corporate body that can sue or be sued in its corporate name. The
Commission consists of thirteen members headed by a Chairman,- who must be qualified
to hold the office of a judge in a superior court of record.6t The remainder of the Com-
50. Id. § 46. Cf. Derby & Co. v. Weldon (No. 6), 1 WLR 1139 (1990).
51. Id. §§ 5(1), 6(a).
52. Id. § 26.
53. Id. § 69.
54. Id. § 47(1)(b).
55. Id. § 68.
56. Id. §§ 43(5), 44(4), 45(2).
57. Id. § 55.
58. Id. § 3(14).
59. Id. § 6(a).
60. Id. § 3.
61. Id. § 3(4). The current and inaugural chairman, Hon M. Akanbi, was the former President of the Court
of Appeal.
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mission is made up of officers who possess all the powers and immunities of police officers.6z
It is the Commission's independence that enables it to take professional responsibility for
issues of corruption. In this way, the Commission avoids juridical limitations to its duties
on charges of "political considerations."
63
Previous attempts to combat corruption show the independence and effectiveness of the
Commission. Previous laws, notably the Banking (Freezing of Accounts) Act of 1983 and
Bank Employee's Etc Act of 1986, concentrated the powers of investigation in the executive
arm of government. Under such legislation, the President exercised responsibility through
the Secretary to the Federal Government and other agencies. Now, under section 6(a), the
Commission has express power to assume responsibilities over corruption related activities
despite contrary provisions in previous legislation. These statutes give rise to extra-
territorial responsibility for acts of corruption like money laundering, fronting, and failure
to disclose.
An important issue is the right to sue the Commission provided by section 3. This pro-
vision is desirable because it allows for the recovery of property rights or contractual deal-
ings with the Commission and it guards against abuse of office and breaches of human
rights. However, the provision could also be used to slow down the work of the Commission
in investigating offences. Potentially, the Commission, in order to carry out its task, will
have to seek declaratory guidelines by way of judicial doctrine from the court, particularly
at the initial stages of investigation. Otherwise, a barrage of lawsuits would frustrate the
effectiveness of the Commission.
I. Offences Constituting or Related to Corruption
A. CORRUPTION AND GRATIFICATION
The Act's purpose is to prohibit and proscribe offences that amount to corruption and
related offences. 64 A broad approach is taken in defining the scope of the prohibited conduct.
The motive of any person is immaterial to finding liability for offences under the Act,
regardless of whether the person is a giver, recipient, associate, or inducer. Motive will
generally cover economic motives or protectionist motives.
Two leading crimes spearhead any understanding of the framework. These are corruption
and gratification. "Corruption includes bribery, fraud and other related offences.
' 65
62. Id. §§ 5(l), 65.
63. This is represented by the Act of State and Political Question doctrines developed by U.S. courts. See
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), 862 F. 2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Corruption is synonymous with secret or unjustified profit, abuse of office, conflict of interest, and
procedural breaches in private or public property by those named.
65. Id. § 2. The Act wisely and widely defines corruption. This wide ambit is because of the novel and
emerging ways corrupt practices may emerge as well as the sociological variables associated with it. See generally
Osinbajo, supra note 7. Section 1(1) of the Banking (Freezing of Accounts) Act of 1983 (now Cap 29 Laws of
the Federation of Nigeria (LFN)1990), which is ordinarily an anti-corruption statute, refers to the "offences
of bribery, corruption, extortion, or abuse of office." The statute is incorporated into the ambit of the law by
section 6(a). Similarly, the concept of unjust enrichment by a Bank employee in the Bank Employees, Etc.
(Declaration of Assets) Decree of 1986 (now Cap 27, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN)1990) is within
the parameters of corruption.
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Gratification is an offence, which means:
a. money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in
property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, or any
other similar advantage, given or promised to any person with the intent to influence
such person in the performance or non performance of his duties;
b. any office, dignity, employment, contract of empowerment or services and any agree-
ment to give employment or render services in any capacity;
c. any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other lia-
bility, whether in whole or in part;
d. any valuable consideration of any kind, any discount, commission, rebate, bonus,
deduction or percentage;
e. any forbearance to demand any money or money's worth or valuable thing;
f. any other service or favour of any description such as protection from any penalty
or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disci-
plinary, civil or criminal nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the
exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of any rights or any official power or
duty; and
g. any offer, undertaking or promise, whether conditional or unconditional, of any
gratification within the meaning of any of the proceeding paragraphs (a) to (f).6
Within the offence of corruption, are variant crimes of corruption that the law prohibits
or penalises. Corruption has been judicially recognized as "a reward or inducement to sway
or deflect a person ... . from the honest and impartial discharge of duties-in other words,
as a bribe for corruption or its price. ' 67 However, corruption may be passive as well as
active. Passive corruption is based on the deliberate and knowing non-performance of a
duty with the motive that another person may benefit from a wrong or other crime.
B. RELATED OFFENCES
Other than these two offences, specific offences related to corruption are provided for
in sections 8-26 of the Act. Other offences include: accepting gratification, giving or ac-
cepting gratification,6s demanding gratification,69 counselling offences relating to corrup-
tion,70 criminal receipt of property,7" postal fraud, 72 deliberate frustration of investigation, 73
using agents to gratify,74 offering bribes to public officers, 7 providing advantages as a mea-
sure of appreciation or to secure future reward,76 and attempt, preparation, and conspiracy
to commit offences. 7
66. Corrupt Practices Act § 9.
67. Per Baraiman JSC in Biobaku v. Police, (1951) 20 N.L.R. 30 (Nig.).
68. Corrupt Practices Act § 9.
69. Id. § 10.
70. Id. § 11.
71. Id. § 13.
72. Id. § 14.
73. Id. § 15.
74. Id. § 17.
75. Id. § 18. See particularly section 18(c), which covers contracts or advantage in favor of any person.
76. Id. § 22.
77. Id. § 26(1).
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C. ANCILLARY OFFENCES
This category of offences covers acts dealing with the nature, failure, or quality of dis-
closure connected to corruption. The Act takes a serious view of the failure to co-operate
with the Commission. A person's duty to tell the truth is immaterial for liability to arise
for making false and misleading statements." Liability may be imposed for refusing to
acknowledge service of summons." Similarly, liability will be imposed under a duty by law
("statutory power") on competent persons who fail to provide information to the Com-
mission. 0 Finally, obstruction of inspection and search shall result in imprisonment without
an option of a fine. Obstruction of inspection and search includes: failure to comply with
lawful demand, failure to produce or attempt to conceal, rescue, or endeavour to rescue an
arrested person, or destroy anything which prevents seizure or security of a thing.l
IV. Extra-Territorial Provisions of the Act
A. THE LEGAL BASES OF AND FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY
It is increasingly recognized by international conventions and declarations and by many
countries that corruption is a threat to international and national domestic financial systems
and, as such, must be actively discouraged.82 In many countries, it is recognized that pro-
ceedings against public officers must be supported. Support is rendered by validating civil
actions to initiate proprietary claims to recover proceeds of corruption or by in personam
proceedings to halt capital flight to more hostile jurisdictions.8" The Act's potential to
extend coverage to agents and private persons who are not citizens of Nigeria goes further,
particularly as it allows for investigation abroad. This raises issues of whether investigation
actions or proceedings will be allowed or tolerated in a foreign state. Objections include
possible defensive assertions that describe such investigations as merely fishing expeditions
or claims of breach of privacy, confidentiality rights, or other obligations, and the mere
audacity of an extra-territorial effect, particularly where the inquiry proceeds on penal
grounds.84 Judicial stonewalling is therefore a strong possibility for various circuitous rea-
sons." The extra-territorial reach is premised on the following bases. It is recognised that
78. Id. § 25.
79. Id. § 34.
80. Id. § 40.
81. Id. § 41.
82. See Posadas, supra note 2. See also Rogoff, supra note 2; Boswell, supra note 22. For examples of conven-
tions and inter state declaration, see The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (Inter-American
Convention), Mar. 29, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 792; UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions (UN Declaration), Dec. 16, 1996,36 I.L.M. 1043; Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Convention on Bribery), Dec. 18, 1997,
37 I.L.M. 1.
83. See generally LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 93
(1994).
84. Cf Nanus Asia Co. Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, I H.K.L.R. 396 (H.K. High Ct. 1990).
85. Courts have generally refused to enforce the public law of another state, where it was made to promote
governmental interests based on politics or economic models. This is despite the fact that in respect to business
methods, certain 'penal, revenue or other public law' infractions of the requesting state or court have taken
place. In those situations the courts have been influenced by the neutrality of actions or legitimacy of trans-
actions in their own countries and protected the defendant. See generally LAWRENCt COLLINS, EssAYs IN
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most persons who corruptly enrich themselves lodge and launder the proceeds in assets and
institutions outside Nigeria. Second, those who perpetrate corruption from abroad must
be dealt with because of the effect on their objects and the society at large. Third, persons
who trade or do business in Nigeria subject themselves to Nigerian law. To this extent,
where available or reachable, persons or property involved can be subject to investigations
and judicial proceedings under the Act. Fourth, certain corrupt practices are by nature extra-
territorial. Typical examples are postal fraud and money laundering. Fifth, the pursuit or
realization of an intended effect in Nigeria is sufficient to attract the force of law. Finally,
the act of corruption is arguably an offence that stands independently of the nation state,
proscribed by international law, and for which Nigeria, as a connected state, has jurisdiction
or a duty under emerging norms to impose its own jurisdiction.
The Act's approach to extra-territoriality in different provisions covers persons, property,
and business activities. Specific provisions mention "outside Nigeria" in relation to of-
fences,s6 persons,87 property,88 and business activities. The Act also addresses concerns with
"cross border crimes." 9 This means that it conceivably will deal with money laundering
via corrupt practices connected to Nigeria. To achieve this task the Commission can engage
the services of INTERPOL or other persons to investigate or trace corrupt practices in
foreign jurisdictions. Two extra-territorial provisions must therefore be recognized. These
are the duty to report bribery transactions, 90 and the duty to co-operate fully.9' Collectively,
they come under a general duty of international law not to undertake or support corruption.
However, the Act does not empower the Commission or any other agency to commence
actions abroad, specifically to recover the proceeds of corruption. Abroad, its provisions
appear to be limited to 'receiving and investigating' corruption charges. On this ground it
authorizes the issuance of summons92 and initiation of an action.93 A possible way of en-
forcing transnational anti-corruption practices is to present evidence of such conduct to
regulatory or law enforcement bodies in foreign states with anti-corruption legislation.94
The Act does not provide redress.
B. A 'CHANCE THEORY OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY'
Even if it is argued that the Act may not be clear as to the extra-territorial scope of the
law, there is room for fashioning judicial support both within and outside Nigeria. The
Commission can approach Nigerian Courts to approve any proposed action abroad, in-
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 98-107, 125-28 (1994); Rogoff, supra note 2, at 115-
16 (book review on the experience and hostility of judicial officers to investigation of Frances's Elf-Acquitaine
scandal involving allegations of secret bribes and commissions in The Republic of Gabon). However, where
fraud is in issue, foreign courts appear more predisposed to judicial assistance.
86. Corrupt Practices Act § 66(1), (3).
87. Id. § 24.
88. Id. §§ 2, 13,24,44,46.
89. Id. § 66(3).
90. Id. §§ 23(2), 27(1).
91. Id. § 25.
92. Id. § 29.
93. Id. § 3(2).
94. However, we shall have to see if in construing those statutes, their existence does not in fact slow down
or block Nigeria's anti-corruption drive. See Denny, supra note 20 (explaining the role of states in indirectly
encouraging corrupt practices).
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herently fashioning a quasi-criminal pre-action remedy or order. Any such action may con-
sequently be served or enforced abroad, subject to the reaction of the local courts in the
place of enforcement. The order will therefore be assessed on the basis of international law,
comity, and judicial co-operation, as well as the public policy or public morality of the
forum.
V. Problems of Enforcement of Legal Norms
Certain issues arise in addressing corruption in general. They deal with proof of agree-
ment and proof of a connection or relationship.
A. AGREEMENT
It is generally difficult in most legal systems to prove underhanded transactions. The Act
seeks to punish persons who "agree" to participate in corrupt acts. 95 The criteria of the
existence of an agreement will be based on Nigerian law and the policy of objective trans-
parency behind the Act. To that extent, parties who unwittingly and innocently find them-
selves connected to a corrupt enterprise need not fear if they cooperate with authorities.
The Act seeks to achieve its justificatory goals by imposing duties on persons to disclose
all relevant and true information.96 Failure to cooperate with the Commission is an offence
and adverse conclusions may be drawn. Secondly, the Act creates presumptions of fact in
certain situations. Third, the Commission or a judge will have to make a reasonable or
objective assessment of the existence of an agreement where there is no direct confession.
Finally, an economic test of the subject matter of corruption will have to be analyzed. 91
B. CONNECTION OR RELATIONSHIP
Establishing a connection between parties is relatively simple. However, linking parties
together who engage in corruption is potentially problematic. The relationship of agent,
employer, and subsidiary will provoke a "reasonable" inquiry under the Act. However, it
may be argued that a person is an "independent agent." Such an argument will not exculpate
liability in circumstances where a person "knowingly gives to any agent ... any receipt,
account, or other document in respect of which the principal is interested and which con-
tains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and
which to his knowledge, is intended to mislead .. .any other person ..."91 To distance
oneself from corrupt motives or actions, of which direct or indirect material benefits can
or did occur, requires the appointment of professionally competent agents. Parties would
be advised to ensure registration and proof of business registration from the agent, request
professional or other qualification in the field, pay a fair and reasonable price as commission
or fees, and most importantly, have a contractual clause forbidding dishonest courses of
conduct. In this situation, this writer recommends an expressly written and notarized con-
tract of employment.
95. Agreement may be found in accept, gives, receives, acts, and the like, used in various provisions of the
Act.
96. See Corrupt Practices Act §§ 25, 28, 40, 41.
97. See also Biobaku v. Police (1951) 20 N.L.R. 30 (Nig.).
98. Corrupt Practices Act § 17(1)(c).
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C. LAWFUL AUTHORITY OR REASONABLE EXCUSE DEFENCE
Under the Act, it is not an offence where, with lawful authority or reasonable excuse, an
advantage, inducement, or reward is offered to another person in relation to public auc-
tions.9 9 Similarly, it is not an offence where offers of like nature are made to public servants
in exchange for giving assistance or using influence in securing a contract or payment for
contract work undertaken.1°° The existence of this defence, if widely interpreted, will in-
capacitate the effectiveness of the policy and provisions of the statute.' 0' The persons claim-
ing exemption must have lawful authority to make or receive the offer. This provision is
intended to be used by investors or business persons who sponsor official travel trips or
benefits connected with a project and who have "a reasonable excuse" for the benefit in-
tended or conferred. However, an offer of reward will generate unease, since public servants
will be exposed to conflict of interest judgments. It is not intended that this reward defence
shall apply to civil servants or full time employees of public institutions.
VI. Recommendations and Conclusions
A. FURTHER REDRESS MEASURES
The statute concentrates on the traditional public office holder. However, it also makes
a foray into private relationships. It focuses on individual persons as the prime actors,
particularly where penal liability in the form of sentencing is to be imposed. In fact, indi-
viduals may be difficult to trace. It may also be difficult to press a judge to impose liability
on an individual employee who was used or pressed into committing an offence. Since
private companies will undertake public duties, the adverse impact that could result from
possible corruption needs to be addressed. First, on recommendation of the Commission,
is the nullification by the court of executory contracts secured by corrupt practices; 0 2 sec-
ond, the dissolution of companies involved in corruption; third, is the suspension or pro-
hibition of companies from engaging in corrupt practices in Nigeria or doing business in
Nigeria; fourth imposing penalties on corporate persons per se, basing punishment on
corporate turnover; and'03 fifth, the inability of statutory fines to deter people from engaging
in corruption. Such amounts will be seen as part of the extra-cost for doing a business,
fostering more corruption. Also, the fines may become meager in a few years' time. Further
considerations include empowering the Commission to recommend or delimit any right of
a person to participate in public office where an individual commits an offence under the
Act. In such a case, no prerogative of pardon by the executive arms of government will
apply. Finally, one of the most effective ways to manage corruption is to empower persons
disadvantaged by it to bring civil actions or claims for damages, or to give evidence in such
99. Id. § 21.
100. Id. § 22(1). Cf id. § 22(2), which allows a public servant with lawful authority or reasonable excuse to
solicit or accept any advantage as an inducement to, or reward for, or otherwise, on account of duties.
101. Cf NELSON ENONCHONG, ILLEGAL TRANSACTIoNs 46 (1998) (stating that, "An agreement whereby a
person is to be paid money to use his influence to procure a benefit from the government is illegal as contrary
to public policy ... Similarly, the court will not allow a claim to recover the price agreed for the plaintiff's
use of his influence to secure the appointment of the defendant to a public office.").
102. Cf Corrupt Practices Act § 49 (voiding any dealing involving seized property which is the subject of
an inquiry).
103. Cf id. § 68 (imposing a fine of NI0,000).
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actions. In proper cases, rules of law may have to be made to allow experts and Commission
officials to give evidence.
B. FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
Due to the extra-territorial nature of the Act, provisions providing for the situs of receipt
of disclosure or information taken or to be taken abroad are necessary.? 4 Second, it is
necessary to provide the place of service or substituted service for foreign companies or
residents105 Third, the Commission, in line with its duty to advise or instruct agencies and
parastatals on how to eliminate or minimise corruption, may choose to advise government
agencies to review and incorporate anti-corruption clauses into bilateral investment con-
tracts.10 6 Fourth, because transnational corruption is notoriously difficult to prosecute, the
Commission will effectively have to assess the capability and capacity of its officials to
successfully undertake the tasks. Experiences in domestic and transnational penal suits sug-
gest that failure in prosecution and litigation proceedings is tied to perceptions of ideo-
logical and political partisanship. Accordingly, the Commission must, as a matter of pro-
fessional pragmatism, retain private consultants, experts, and quasi-public institutions as
experts to assess the whole scope of its actionable claims and to discharge accusations of
partisanship. Economic incentives and policies for rewarding companies and investors who
co-operate with fighting corruption are essential. Finally, the Commission must issue pe-
riodic regulations and policy statements. This would guide professionals working in differ-
ent areas of interest to the commission. It would assure participants of the parameters of
dealing and promote fair and competitive practices.
C. THE FUTURE
Elimination of economic corruption is the duty of the professional class in various coun-
tries, particularly Nigeria. This is because corruption threatens the integrity of the liberal
market state and the emerging global economy. Nigeria will have to work with other gov-
ernments, bodies, and international institutions to combat its own scourge of corruption.
The government, the traditional source and harbinger of corruption, paradoxically must,
on its own, doggedly pursue the anti-corruption goal through the Commission. In order
to ensure the Commission is not another inefficient bureaucracy, the government must fully
fund the Commission to assure its independence, while designing non-partisan transparent
review procedures to measure the success and activities. On its own, the Commission must
consciously and actively nurture a patriotic municipal class of professional collaborators in
the fight against internal and external acts of corruption.
Apart from the Commission, two views emerge on how to ameliorate extra-territorial
corruption. The first view utilizes the role and interest of the executive arm of government.
The second involves consideration and use of self and voluntary regulations by key players
in the Nigerian economy. Regarding the role of the executive, the federal ministries of
Justice, Commerce, and External affairs would have to work with the Presidency to promote
recognition and respect for the Act and other initiatives by trading partners, re-evaluating
104. The Nigerian Embassy, High Commission, or other office that the Commission may designate.
105. This may be by service through diplomatic offices in Nigeria.
106. Corrupt Practices Act § 6(c).
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the role of commercial laws and traditions in promoting corruption, and also promoting
and signing anti-corruption pacts with other states. Foreign states with long-term interests
must actually help train professionals in the field of ethics and legal regulation. States who
refuse to co-operate must be diplomatically and economically engaged. The second view,
which advocates self and voluntary regulations, is founded on the belief that major players
consider themselves good corporate citizens or stakeholders in the Nigerian economy and
polity. Recent experiences, as well as studies and reports by independent analysts and re-
searchers convincingly suggest that self- regulation would not work, particularly where it
is foreign related. °7 Very few companies can be trusted with anything other than their own
corporate interests. It is unrealistic to expect that many foreign states will fully co-operate,
where they are indirect beneficiaries of a 'share of the loot.'
Notwithstanding the present state of the legal and political development of the Nigerian
initiative, without an observed duty of co-operation in private and public institutions and
between judicial and legislative authorities worldwide, corruption will be exported to the
most unlikely places. The political and global commercial community is called to recognize
the role of the law in what it seeks to do. It is legislation that, if allowed to fail, would have
great implications for the international community.10 Since completing this article, Presi-
dent George W. Bush has visited Nigeria and other African states with a promise of part-
nership for peace, prosperity, and security. The United Kingdom has expressed the same
determination. These partnerships will only be successful where these countries and others
help fight corruption; the country's number one enemy. Otherwise, post 9/11, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and other major trading countries' interests are susceptible to
serious damage via corrupt routes. With the new Act, there is a glimmer of hope for the
anti-corruption drive, since success with it is recognized as part of strategies for investment
and development. 109 The Act's private and extra-territorial application will therefore clearly
have to be put into use to demonstrate the preparedness of the Commission to carry out a
core duty.
107. Denny, supra note 20 (reporting on the criticisms and unpopularity of the initiatives in the oil sector).
Cf Carola Hoyos, Africans to Disclose Details of Oil Deals, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at 11 (Nigeria and the
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe agreed to publish details of licensing rounds based on UK led Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative. On the other hand, other connected African counties have refused to
participate).
108. For views confirming the implications of extra-territorial implications of corruption on foreign coun-
tries, see Rogoff, supra note 2, 119-23. Recently, Honorable Tony Blair MP in Parliament has identified thedifficulty of unilateral regulation of UK oil companies thereby endangering their competitiveness abroad by
unilateral actions. On the other hand, the UK recognizes the effect of corruption on its own domestic and
foreign policies.
109. Nonetheless, it must be suggested that overzealousness or mediocrity must be avoided to preventjustificatory procedural attitudes that will encourage a new climate of corruption. Perhaps, the Commission
will devise standard or sectoral rules for all parties to ease confidence and predictability. See Corrupt PracticesAct § 6(b)-(d).
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